Counter-Intelligence followed the troops. That institution has never been used so widely as in the last Civil War. It was organized not only by high staffs and military governors, but by almost all military units, political organizations. the Don. Kuban and Terek governments... even ... by the Propaganda department... .It was a fashion. a sickly mania produced by mutual distrust and suspicion. which spread throughout the country.
General Denikin' Introdnction'
The activity of various intelligence and security institutions during the Russian Civil War is a complex and understudied topic. It is difficult to fmd any other period in modem Russian history before 1992, in which so many independent or autonomous authorities engaged in espionage and counter-intelligence. The Red and White Armies each organized and operated large counter-intelligence operations during the civil war. Yet the history of intelligence and counter-intelligence during the Russian Civil War has not yet been written. For many years, Soviet historians were not interested in presenting or allowed to present a balanced evaluation picture of such White activities. A favorite subject in novels and movies was the victory of honest and gentle "Chekists" over "White bandits, II who never even came close to victory. Since the opening of the relevant archives, other issues and interests have taken priority causing this topic to remain under-researched. Without denying the limited value of Soviet historiography, the publications of Bolshevism's opponents in exile shed little light on this issue. They did not present many details about their intelligence operations and remained virtually silent about the secret connections of White agents in Soviet Russia. Naturally, White memoirists had a very important reason to keep quiet about the latter: they did not want harm military intelligence sections were held in 1908 and 1912. Their purpose was to designbetter ways to coordinate central and local intelligence services. In the field of counter-intelligence, the participants decided to strengthen the powers of the General Staff of the Russian Army to oversee such operations at the expense of security sections (okhrannye otdeleniia). From 1908, counter-intelligence in peacetime wascarriedout by seniorofficers of the PoliceDepartment (ZJzandarmskoe upravlenie) and the Border-guard Department under the supervision of senior adjutants of the military districts. In 1909, a Special Inter-departmental Commission headed by the Director of the Police Department was organized in an effort to improve counter-intelligence activities.
During World War I, counter-intelligence sections (kontrrazvedyvatel'nye otdeleniia) were established as Special sections (Osobye chasti) of the staffs of the Supreme Commander, Front Commanders, and Army Commanders. Although the reforms that began in 1908 enhanced Russian counter-intelligence efforts and no doubt contributed to the unmasking of foreign agents, the expansion of intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts during the war fueled a widespread anti-espionage paranoiathroughout Russian society. 4 Shortly after the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, the Headquarters of the Supreme Conunander in Mogilev came under Red control. As a result, the anti-Bolshevik military movement, which soon developed in South Russia, had to organize its intelligence and counter-intelligence services without any formal connections to the existing system. However, the Volunteer Armydid benefit from the experience of many prominent Generals, including the former Supreme Commanders Mikhail Alekseev and LavrKornilov, as wellas somequalified General Staffofficers and regularArmyofficers with intelligence experience and capabilities. It was these personnel who helped to establish new intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.
Even before the Bolshevik seizure of power, General Alekseev had formed an extensive underground officer organization which became the embryo of the Volunteer Army apparatus that was headquartered in southern Russia.S It must be 3 stressed that, in setting up their intelligence and counter-intelligence institutions, the Volunteer Army's Command could not rely on the Russian army's existing intelligence apparatus since it was under Bolshevik control. For this reason, the I Whites' intelligence network reflected the lessons learned during the previous decade and was driven by the necessity to maintain regular connections with the anti-Bolshevik political activists in Moscow and Petrograd.
White Counter-Intelligence Organization For most of the first year of the Volunteer Army's existence, there was no organizational and bureaucratic separation between its intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. Both focused their effots on supporting the Army by any means: recruitment of officers, Cossacks and other citizens (at that time on a volunteer basis); obtaining reliable information about political and military events in various regions of Russia (including the central and local Soviet administration and the Red Army Command); maintaining friendly relations with Allied representatives; and, of course, identifying the Bolshevik's strategic and tactical military plans and operations.
In reality, all these functions were often carried out by the same persons. Some leading White officers were ordered to various cities and territories where they generally operated without any financial and organizational support from headquarters. The information they obtained was often determined not by their personal skills and capabilities as intelligence operatives, but by chance. 6 In November 1917, nine representatives of three liberal anti-Bolshevik organizations established the "Moscow Center". Originally headed by the Kadets, it turned increasingly to the right and was renamed the Right Center. This Center had its own military staff, which included a counter-intelligence department headed by Captain (later Colonel) Rodion Mergin, and was responsible for sending officers to the Volunteer Army in the Don region and for obtaining secret information from well-placed informants in the nascent Soviet administration. Curiously, at that time, Captain Rodion Mergin was not formally a member of the Volunteer Army and later had to solicit letters of recommendation that confirmed his intelligence activities in order to be promoted. ' Vasilii Vitalievich Shulgin, a famous right-wing politician, backed the Volunteer Army from its birth. While living in Kiev, he renewed the publication of his newspaper Kievlianin, the office of which became the center for Russian military officers who wished to join the Volunteer Army. About fifteen hundred officers did so during its first two months; however, there is no evidence how many of them actually managed to reach the Don region where the Army was stationed. Arrested by the Bolsheviks, Shulgin spent some time in prison. Because of his consistently pro-Allied views, he was forced to cease publishing his newspaper and turned to underground activity. Shulgin's secret organization was named Asbuka, because the pseudonyms of its members corresponded to the letters of Old Russian Alphabet. The organization provided intelligence information about the situation in Kiev and Ukraine to the Allied missions, the Volunteer Army Conunand and the Right Center, sought to influence the Volunteer Army, and helped the Russian officers to reach its forces. Azbuka also maintained close links with French intelligence in Kiev, French representatives in Jassy, Romania, and the British mission in Moscow. In Moscow, British representatives acted as coordinators between the Azbuka .and the Right Center. It should be mentioned that the Aibuka, in carrying out its various intelligence functions, had no formal affiliation with the Volunteer Army. After moving to Ekaterinodar in early August 1918, Shulgin repeatedly sought such affiliation but, as we will see, did not succeed. 8 Some very respectable intelligence and counter-intelligence work in the Don region was carried out by N. F. Sigida, a former Second Lieutenant in the Imperial Guard. Upon reaching Taganrog after his escape from Bolshevik Petrograd, he received a secret order from the Volunteer Army Staff to infiltrate the Red Army. After Taganrog fell into Bolshevik hands, Nikolai Sigida remained there and eventually became a member of the Collegium under the Military Commissar; specifically, he was in charge of military operations against the Volunteer Army. He was assigned to this high position on the strength of the recommendation of his former university classmate, Evgenii Bolotin, a finance commissar of the Don Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars). Sigida tried to use all opportunities in order to sabotage the Bolsheviks' regional military administration. He proved to be very successful in manipulating jealousies and engendering squabbles among Soviet functionaries, and in encouraging their inclinations to drunkenness and a dissolute Iife. 9 IIWe did not have any real administration, because nobody could administer, II he wrote in his memoirs which were deposited to the Russian State Historical Archives in Prague, II [E]verythingadministereditself....The most effective 'lighting rods' in that situation were alcohol and women. It is hard to imagine that these two temptations could have been more popular in any other time. It was possible to do everything using that bait. 1110 As a member of the Collegium, Sigida regularly attended Don Sovnarkom meetings in Rostov, where he had regular contacts with influential Bolsheviks including Fedor Podtelkov, Alexei Avtonomovand Sergo Ordzhonikidze. As he later wrote, 1I0ur razvedchiki [the intelligence officers-V.B.] enjoyed unlimited access. The secret organization of Colonel Orlov and the local intelligence network set up by the Volunteer Army placed their members among all Soviet institutions. Our intelligence had eyes and ears everywhere, beginning from the local militia posts to the People's Commissar and, thanks to their work, was always fully informed about events. Our agents occupied positions from the ordinary militiaman to the People's Commissar himself. 1111 After being arrested by the Bolsheviks shortly before the German occupation in the spring of 1918, Sigida escaped and joined the detachment of Colonel M. G. Drozdovskii which marched through Taganrog en route to Volunteer Army headquarters. Despite the Drosdovskii detachment's openly pro-Allied orientation, its intelligence service (razvedyvatel 'nyipunkt)maintained informal, mainly personal, connections with German commanders in Ukraine, due primarily to their common anti-Bolshevik views.P The strengthof this common bond is clear from the fact that Drozdovskii ordered Sigida to leave his detachment so as to help the Germans maintain civic order in Rostov. He supplied Sigidanot only with a staff and arms but also with signedblank warrants to arrest and search the residents of Rostov. At this time, Sigida ceased his intelligence activity and began to engage in counter-intelligence activities, mostof which centered on political affairs rather than on military counter-intelligence directed against foreign spies. But his powers extended beyond those of normal political counter-intelligence work since his new positionempowered him to search, arrest, investigate, adjudicate, and even execute suspects. The granting of such wide-ranging powers soon became a common feature of the Whitecounter-intelligence services. Like his counterparts in the Cheka, Sigida viewed his treatment of enemies of the Whites as merciless but just:
I received information about all detainees in Rostov not later than fifteen minutes after their arrival in prison. This included the names of the prisoners and the reasons for their arrest. After receiving this information, the prisoners were brought before me and were asked to provide the names of persons relevant to their cases-these included witnesses for their defense, because we always had witnesses accuse them....The relevant investigation did not take more than twenty-four hours; after this interval, the prisoner, whatever his standing, was either freed and furnished with appropriate documents, or was executed (shot). We did not have any other form of punishment, but proceeded with the investigation very carefully.
•..The severity and haste with which the judgment was carried out was based on the following considerations: First, a harmful situation will never tum into a beneficial one; second, everyone having taken one eye must pay with two; third, the best medical treatment is a surgical one. These were the principles upon which our actions were based, since those who have tasted power will always strive to achieve it and, having attained power, will revert to their old days. 13 Nikolas Sigida's unrestricted counter-intelligence activities in Rostov ended in late May 1918. Because of complaints from left-wing, non-Bolshevik intellectuals, the German Commandant of Rostov officially deprived Sigida of the right to shoot suspects, but at the same time confirmed his unofficial status: "I do not intend to interfere in your affairs. Do it, but be cautious, that's a11." 14 The Volunteer Army also created a network of Centers which played a considerable role in intelligence and the counter-intelligence activities in 1918-1919. On 21 May 1918, General Alekseev approved the creation of a plan to organize Political Centers of the Volunteer Army in the major cities of Russia. As proposed by General M. I. Shtengel, the purposes of the Centers were to publicize the slogans of the Volunteer Army, to enlist new officers and soldiers, and to conduct political and military intelligence. The order officially creating the Volunteer Army Centers was signed on 10 October 1918. It confirmed their staffs, including the heads of counter-intelligence operations and the intelligenceagents. The Centers' Commanders were official representatives of the Volunteer Army Commander-in-Chief in their respective areas. Over the course of the next few months, Centers of the Volunteer Army were established in Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Chernigov, Poltava, Nikolaev, Kherson, Mogilev, Kislovodsk, Titlis, and Sukhurn as well as in the Crimea and Siberia. Most of these Centers were linked to the Army Staff through secret officer organizations and were headed by high ranking military personnel, including three full Generals, six Lieutenant-Generals, one Vice-Admiral, twelve Major-Generals and fourteen General Staff Colonels. Among them were some well known White Army officers: Bredov, Neniukov, Lomnovskii, Shilling, Shteifon, Bode, Agapeev, von Lampe, Lebedev, and Flug among others. In spring 1918, all reports from the Centers were personally processed by a Chief of the Army Staff and his close subordinates, and later also by the Military-Political Department, the Political Chancellory of the Special Council, the Intelligence Section (Razvedyvatel 'noe otdelenie) and the Special Unit (Osobaia chast') of the Commander-in-Chief Staff.IS General Shtengel himself became the head of the Taganrog Center, which administered the territory from Berdiansk to Taganrog. To carry out his mission, he often relied on the Union of Army Invalids and the Cooperative Saving Bank society (with 54 local branches) through which he procured financial resources. Through these two orgnizations, Shtengel comunicated with various political parties and groups. Twice a month he sent political reports to the Special Section (Osobaia ehast1 of the Volunteer Army Staff, which was in charge of counter-intelligence. 16 From spring 1918 until autumn 1919, the Kiev Center operated in widely varying conditions during alternating periods of attempted governance by the Hetman Germans, Ukrainian Directorate, and Bolsheviks. During the last several weeks of the Hetman rule, the Center even functioned legally and was allowed to coordinate the activities ofvarious organizations working for the Volunteer Army. The Center's Political Department was then based in the Shulgin's Azbukaand a commander of its Kiev branch, Colonel Bartsevich, served as a department head within the Center. It was the Kiev Center that initiated the formation of the National Union (Natsional'noe Obnedinenie), which included a wide spectrum of anti-Bolshevik politicians ranging from Mensheviks (the oborontsy faction) to Octobrists and Nationalists. At the same time, the Center carried out its intelligence activity on a strictly conspiratorial basis. Its agents worked in various administrative and military institutions, had access to secret, encoded documents and provided very skillful sabotage of Soviet policy. Some of the Center's agents managed to obtain prestigious positions in the Red Army Command and the intelligence information that they gathered contributed to Volunteer Army victories. The Kiev Center also tried to support and coordinate the activity of other Centers of the Volunteer Army in the Ukraine. However, it had many problems in communicating with the Volunteer Amy Staff in Ekaterinodar and often did this indirectly through Odessa.17
The Kharkov Center was succesful not only in providing valuable secret information, but also in organizing the anti-Bolshevik putsch on the eve of the city's liberation by the Volunteer Army. The head of the Kharkov Center, Colonel Dvigubskii, served as a deputy to the Red Army's Conunander of the Ukraniain Front, Antonov-Ovseenko, and presented his reports directly to Lev Trotsky. In this capacity, he wassentto inspect the military administration in Odessa and the Crimea, and there obtained valuable intelligence infonnation. In an effort to divert the attention of the Red Army Command from the Donbass region, where the Volunteer Army was experiencing difficulties, Dvigubskii took measures to provoke "the revolutionary march" of Soviet troops to Romania. Among his counter-intelligence activities were his facilitating articles in the press about "the world revolution" and "the class obligations of Russian proletariat," fostering disagreements among local Bolshevik and Red Army leaders, and presenting the plan of advance on Romania that wasadopted by the RedArmyHigh Command. During the Romanian campaign, he did all that he could to preventBolshevik success. He apparently played a role in the resignation of Antonov-Ovseenko. As soon as the Bolsheviks retreated from Romania, Colonel Dvigubskii was appointed as head of the Kharkov Center of the Intelligence section of the Armed Forces of South Russia Staff. J8 During the first year of the Civil war, the Volunteer Army's intelligence operations became strongerandmoresophisticated, andeventually wereincorporated into the Army's military staffs, either as departments (otdely), sections (otdeleniia) or units (chastl) , depending on the kind of the military formations. The most important of the intelligence organizations were the Intelligence Section of the Volunteer Army Commander (Conunander-in-Chief), and later (from 1919) the Intelligence Sectionof the Armed Forcesof South Russia Commander-in-Chief Staff. According to official regulations, theywerein charge of gathering information about planned military operations and the views of the enemy's military commanders and political leaders as well as the attitudes of residents in various locales."
Although various White organizations charged with gathering intelligence formed early in the Civil War, no special institution for counter-intelligence was organized during first few months of the Volunteer Army's existence. Nonetheless somecounter-intelligence functions were carried out by different means. The caseof counter-intelligence activities in the Kuban in the spring of 1918 is illustrative. The Volunteer Army's occupation and assertion of control in the Kuban necessitated establishing networks to provide information on opponents of the Whites, on supporters of the recently deposed Soviet administration, and the existence of any conspiracies." Under these circumstances, military counter-intelligence, previously directed against foreign spies, became transformed into a kind of internal political police and incorporated into a system of military dictatorship. As before, the Counter-Intelligence unit was an instituiton of the General-Quartermaster Board of the Commander-in-Chief Staff. And at the lower levels the counter-intelligence services were organized by and under the supervision of the Chiefs of Staffs and the Quartermasters of the respective military formations.
In the spring of 1918, at the time of the Second Kuban March, the Military-Political Department of the Volunteer Army was organized. Although subordinated to General A1ekseev, it was not a part of the Commander's Staff. According to the signed agreement that created the department, A1ekseev, who was based in Novocherkassk, was in charge of the Volunteer Army's political, civilian and financial affairs, while General Denikin, who stayed with his Staff on the front line, exercised military command. In practical terms, however, the lines of demarcation were often blurred. In its effort to fulfill its duties, the Military-Political Department, headed by General Staff Colonel la. M. Lisovoi, not only requested secret information from the Volunteer Army Centers and from some counter-intelligence institutions, but often interfered in the affairs of the Conunander's Staff. 21 After the formation of the Special Council (Osoboe soveshchanie) and the death of General Alekseev, the Military-Political department was dissolved on 11 October 1918, and its responsibilities were divided between the Commander-in-Chiers Staffand the appropriate departments of the Special Council. 22 The system of rule established by General Denikin was a pure military dictatorship. Its civilian administration was organized according to the military rules, and heads of the regions usually had full military powers-beginning with the system of military governors and their deputies for civilian affairs to the working out of regulations for governors-in-chief (glovnonadtalstvuiusnchie oblastei), governors (nachal'nilci gubernii) and district chiefs {nachal'niki uezdov).23 Although one might expect such a system to lead to the consolidation and simplification of the state apparatus, such was not the case. Rather the system spawned a huge bureacracy and fierce rivalries among officials. This was particularly true for intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.
As mentioned above, counter-intelligence units were incorporated into the Quartennasters's boards of military command staffs; intelligence units were usually incorporated into special departments. Parallelling this system was the so-called However, the Naval Board also participated in its supervision.Z1
Counter-intelligence officials also crossed paths and, in many cases, clashed with local police or the gendarmerie of the State Security Institution (Gasudarstvennaia strazha) within the Interior Department of the Special Council.
In September 1919, the State Security Institution had twenty brigades with 77,393 men-about half the size of the Volunteer Army. District police officers (pristavy) operated in uezdy, whileguardsandvillage elders operated in volosti. River, port and fortress brigades, as well as criminal and investigative units, were also organized. During these years of political, military and economic chaos, it was often difficult to delineate ordinary criminal activities from the underground activities of political opponents." This situationwas reflected in the organization of agencies charged with dealing with crime. The Criminal Investigation Boards (Ugolovno-rozysknye upravleniia), which were under the governors' protection, were in charge of investigating ordinary crimes and political crimes. Formerdeputies of DistrictCourt Prosecutors usually headed these Boards, although former "respected and energetic" gendarmerie or counter-intelligence officers could also occupy these positions after leaving military service. While drawing a clear line between ordinary crimes and political crimes often proved difficult, efforts were made to bestow privileges on those officials engaged in political or II state-criminal" investigations. 29 Competing Counter-Intelligence Services This paper focuses on only Volunteer Army institutions and the territory of the Armed Forces of South Russia. But in reality, residents as well as civilian and military officials of the lands occupied by the Whites dealt with various authorities, including various and competing counter-intelligence services. The Cossacks of the three Southern Cossack hosts (voisko) (the Don, Kuban and Terek hosts) had their own counter-intelligence and informative services, whichwere subordinated to their Atamans, governmental organs and local authorities. The first of these were formed as early as 1917. As a result of the unstable political situation in the Ukraine, Crimea, NorthernCaucasus andTrans-Caucasia, intelligence andcounter-intelligence activities in these areas often overlapped or came into conflict. In Kiev, under the Hetman rule, there were 18 different intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations, which "were mainly interested in watching each other". The special sections of the pro-Denikin volunteer detachments hadno directconnections with the Volunteer Army Staff. In Odessa, many independent services operated under French occupation: the International Informative-Bureau headed by Lt. Colonel Tishevskii; the Information Bureau of General K. I. Globachev; the Information Bureau of newspaper employees; the counter-intelligence service of the Russo-German Union of Monarchist-Christians (led by Captains Vachnadze and Vinogradov); the counter-intelligence services of the Volunteer Army Command in Odessa; the staff of General A. V. Shvarts; the Ukrainian Directorate forces, to name onlythe leading ones. 30 The counter-intelligence unit of the Armed Forces of SouthRussia Staffdealt withthe respective insitutions of the Cossack Voisko Governments (whose territories were outside the direct rule of General Denikin and enjoyed their own self-administration), the counter-intelligence of the Don Army Staff (whose Commander was reported to General Denoon as well to the Don Ataman), the counter-intelligence units of local military administrators, and many other similar organizations. According to a report to General Denikin: lilt seems that any administrator, occupying even a secondary position and having control over secret amounts of money, establishes his own counter-intelligence service. The functions of these counter-intelligence services are extremely varied. Disturbing each other, all these institutions frostrate a proper organization of the national order and welfare. They undermine any authority of the power as well army personnel. 1131 Documents oftwocompeting counter-intelligence services-the Armed Forces of SouthRussiaCommand and the Kuban Cossack Voisko-provide insight into the relations between such institutions. Their talented agents enjoyed access to highly sensitive documents about the military-political situation in the White South and the many conflicts between the different anti-Bolshevik forces. These documents also provide valuable insights into the tragic events of the Cossack self-administration in the Kuban-the Kubanskoe deistvo (the Kuban action)-in November 1919.
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Several reports, covering the period from May to October 1919, provide details about the meetings of Rustambekov, the Azerbaijanian representative under the Kuban Govermnent, and such leading members of the Kuban Voisko Rada as Riabovol, Sultan Shakhim-Girei, Ivan and Petr Makarenko, Omelchenko and Bezkrovnyi. All of them agreed to coordinate their efforts to oppose Denikin's rule, to inspire anti-Denikin uprisings in the Caucasus, and to attack the rear of the Volunteer Army at the height of the latter's advance toward Moscow. They hoped to rely on the Ukrainian troops of Simon Petliura, on Green military formations, and even on links with the Bolsheviks. "Your main mistake is your war against the Bolsheviks with whom it is easier to come to terms than with the Volunteer Army, II Rustambekov argued. Meanwhile, Bezkrovnyi stated: "It seems to me that the Bolsheviks, being in such critical situation, will agree to many concessions at the expense of saving Great Russia and Moscow. And we should use the moment." 
Counter-Intelligence Personnel
Many opponents of Bolshevism occupied important positions in Soviet military and administrative institutions, and many of them actively tried to sabotage Bolshevik policy. Of course, it does not mean that they were "white agentsII or even had any connections withtheanti-Bolshevik underground groups andintelligence services.But some of them did have such connections and it was the function of the Volunteer ArmyCenters to organize suchpeople in various institutions for coordinated activity, including gathering intelligence. Two interesting episodes of the intelligence activity in the Bolshevik hinterland suffice to illustrate the natureof the Centers' efforts and activities. The first involves an agent who was sent to Moscow directly from the Volunteer Army Staff; the second involves a group of Odessa teenagers who volunteered to coordinate their independent activities with the Whites.
The 38 It is the only document about the Sovnarkom meetings on 2-3 August 1918 at which Lenin announced that Soviet power was in hopeless situation and declared that it was necessary lito bang on a door," to increase the terror against the bourgeoisie.
At anti-semitic. Members of the Union of Russians helped link the Odessa partisan detachment with the counter-intelligence center in Novorossiisk and through it with the Commander-in-Chief Staff. The Odessa partisan detachment, which was divided in three groups, successfully assassinated several Cheka and Soviet leaders in the city. They also had regular meetings with the counter-intelligence people from Novorossiisk, from whom they received secret information, new instructions and requests. Afterthe arrest of several members, G. Belyi and N. Fesenko moved from Odessa andjoined the 39th Soviet regiment, commanded by the prominent Odessa criminal, Mishka Iaponchik, andstaffed mostly by Jews. Using forged identification cards, theysoonheldpositions as company commanders andcompletely disorganized this regiment. Returning to Odessa after the Volunteer Army's return, the two teenagers tried to continue their intelligence and counter-intelligence activity, but encountered resistance owing to White bureaucracy and mass corruption. The mysterious assasination of Colonel Kirpichnikov, the head of the counter-intelligence department of the Novorossiia regional command staff (located in Odessa) has been mentioned in various published historical sources." But the memoirs of G. Belyi is the only document that provides details aboutthis important event. It was carried out by the former members of the Odessa partisandetaclunent headed by Belyi. The detachment presented to Kirpichnikov's office much information about famous Bolshevik activists living illegally or even legally in Odessa. But arrests did not follow; on the contrary, some of the partisans' relatives were arrested. The reason for this lay in the corruption of Kirpichnikov, who was irresponsible and willingly took bribes. Finally, on the night of 14 January 1920, Colonel Kirpichnikov's car wasstopped by six menin military uniform andG. Belyi shot him."
Kirpichnikov was not the only corrupt and unsavory member of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Although there is much evidence that Bolshevik agents worked in White counter-intelligence organizations and White agents worked in the Cheka instlnnlons.? it is really impossible to guage accurately the level of corruption and duplicity within the various counter-intelligence services.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the case of General K. I. Globachev, a former headof the Petrograd Security section (okhrannoe otdelenie): "A very unworthy type of political and criminal investigative agent [who] is produced by the officer cadre thrownon the street. This type does not haveany ideological orientation and in most cases is a professional soldier. Later this individual is transformed°into a counter-intelligence officerfor theWhitemovement andinto a che/dst [Cheka officer] for the Reds. His absolutely unprincipled character allows [him] to serve either side and to sell out the less dangerous and profitable one. They are so-called double agents. As a result, entire contingents of the counter-intelligence officers have been created, who only disgraced counter-intelligence organs of the White movement during the Civil war.1143 This assessment is confirmed by various people. One young junior officer, P. I. Kuznetsov, reminisced that lithe Civil War changed the outlook of many and gave rise to a special type of officer, who could only be inspired in thosecruel times in which all humanity recedes and only animalistic instincts surface, and in which both sides try to outdo one another in brutality. "44 General K. I. Globachev, a personhighly qualified in political investigation, served in counter-intelligence positions in Kiev in 1918 under HetmanSkoropadskii, as head of the State Security Department (Derzhavna VaTta) , and as head of the counter-intelligence unit in the pro-Denlkin volunteer brigade of General Kirpichev. But his effortsto securea similarposition in the Armed Forcesof South Russiawere rebuffed. Although he received several veryprestigious offersin the autumn of 1919, he rejected these. Finally, in late 1919, he agreed to head the Odessa Naval district's counter-intelligence operation. In January 1920, he replaced the assasinated Colonel Kirpichnikov as headof the counter-intelligence unit of the Novorossiia regiontroops Commander Staff, but it was only for the final ten days before the evacuation of Odessa."
The Asbuka: A Case of Volunteer Intelligence Any survey of the White's intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in South Russia would not incomplete without a discussion oftheAt.buka. Given thata general review of its activities can be found in Peter Kenez's book," this examination will focus on the attempts of Vasilii Shulgin andhis fellows to incorporate theAibuka into the Volunteer Army administration.
The Azbuka was organized by V. N. Shulgin in Kiev as an independent institution. It recruited agents from among military officers, and sent them to the Volunteer Army, and gathered intelligence from various partsof the country. Butthe Azbuka did not have sufficient resources to continue this work after the removal of its mainsection to Ekaterinodar. On 5 September 1918, Shulgin presented a proposal to the deputy Chairman of the Special Council and deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, General A. M. Dragomirov, a personal friend of Shulgin'sand a co-founder of the Azbuka. Because at that timehis organization received financial support from the National Center and from some private resources, he did not request money. Yet he did request that Dragomirov give all Atbuka members the status of the Volunteer Army employees witha length of service dating fromthe start of their work in Abzuka. This was especially necessary for the officers who needed to prove continuity of service.
Shulgin'srequest wasapproved butbecause of bureau interference theAzbuka members were granted only the status of the Army reserve personnel. Eight months later, Shulgin presented to the Duty General (Dezhumyi general) of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff a request in which he discussed the mistake and submitted a corrected list of the Azbuka members. After waiting for more than a month, he submitted another request in which he stressed the secret natureof Azbuka activities and the necessity to follow the rules of conspiracy which did not allow the use of regular correspondence and identification documents. Shulgin requested 20 confirmation of the Azbuka seal and letterheads as well as free train tickets for official missions of the Azbukaagents. General Denikin denied the request. A month later, Shulgin sent a new letter asking for the exclusive right to compile and to keep personal files of the Azbuka members who were waiting for promotion, but who could not be mentioned in regular staff orders. General Lukomskii, the acting Chairman of the Special Council, refused to approve this request and ordered that all documents which listed officers be attached and distributed among the Staffaccording to established proceedure despite their highly sensitive nature."
Several other attempts to incorporate the Azbuka into the Army Staff system and to supply it with very modest amounts of money were also rejected. General Denikin wrote in his comments for a budget draft: ItI regard it is absolutely impossible to have such huge expenses for the Ekaterinodar Center .... 1148 But it is odd even to compare financial claims of the Azbuka with those of its "competitors. II In February 1919, the Azbuka requested 750,000 rubles, but received only 120,550. At the same time, the Osvag received 25 million rubles for the first quarter of 1919. In June 1919, the Azbuka received 500,000 rubles instead of 750,000 requested; after that it received nothing except 75,000 rubles in December 1919 to cover liquidation expenses." As a rule, the Aibuka agents worked without payor awards, yet they provided the Conunander-in-Chief with important information from various parts of the country. Unlike other secret services of the White South, there were no accusations against the Azbuka members of corruption, bribery, robbery or using their job for personal gain. The last attempt to legalize the Azbuka's status took place in November 1919, and was also unsuccesful due to routine bureacratic reasons. The head of the Award Section of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, Colonel Iatsenko, approved a proposal to promote the Azbuka's agents to new ranks, but unrealistically insisted on a list of required documents. At that time, the Azbuka's agents lived in Taganrog, some of them with their families; many were starved, wore old and ragged clothes, suffered from various diseases, and occupied excessively crowded apartments. so
Until now, precisely who worked in the Azbuka, except for Vasilii Shulgin and a handful known associates, has remained a mystery. Using various documents from archives in Russia, the United States and France, the author has been able to compile a list of agents serving in the Aibukaduring its existence (fromlate 1917 to late 1919). The list consists of 110 family names (20 of them also with their pseudonyms) and includes one General, 16 Colonels, 18 civilian officials and 11 women.51 Most of them, irrespective of their rank, operated as regularcouriers who routinely (and illegally) crossed front lines, in some cases dozens of times, with extremely sensitive information. Others served in the Abzuka's secret, infonnation, evacuation, communication and photography departments, as well as in its branches in such cities as Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinodar and Taganrog.
The Azbuka was rejected by Denikin's administration, and failed to compete successfully with the intelligence, counter-intelligence and the Osvag institutions in influencing Denikin's policy-makers. The routines of bureaucratic correspondence and red tape, as well as the jealousy of the other secret services, proved to be much more important to this outcome than did the great respect for the Azbuka withinhigh governmental circles and the existence of personal ties to its leadership.
Unrealized Projects of Reorganization
The High Command of the Volunteer Armyand the Armed Forces of South Russia wasfully awareof theproblems connected withits counter-intelligence activities. The necessity of reorganizing them was indisputable. But as General Denikin candidly noted:
It was necessary either to abolish the whole institution and to let power be blindand unprotected in conditions of espionage, unrest, treason, Bolshevik agitation, and an organized work of disorder, or to undertake a complete replacement of the counter-intelligence cadre. 51 Completely replacing the cadrewould have beentoo disruptive and damaging. Hence efforts to reform counter-intelligence operations were initiated.
Among the various projects to reform the counter-intelligence service presented to the High Command of the White South, the proposal of A. A. Khvostov, entitled "Onmeasures to reinforce a struggleagainst internal Bolshevism,II is noteworthy. Completed in Rostov on 8 September 1919, the report contained several original and constructive suggestions. Khvostov's evaluation of the counter-intelligence service was harsh: "The institution of counter-intelligence in its present condition is a wholly unsatisfactory one. It terrorizes potential supporters of the Volunteer Army, and it is not sufficienty energetic in its primaryduty-to detect the Bolsheviks." He stressed the questionable ethics of many agents, their unfamiliarity with routineproblems of political investigation, theirpolitical illiteracy, their reluctance to cooperate withlocal administrations, and the lackof real command and control of the higher institutions over their subordinates. He considered that the most efficient way to improve the situation was to unify all political investigations into a single institution based on the respective services of the Military, Interior and Propaganda Departments. He suggested that a special political investigations board, incorporated either in the Interior or the Military Departments, be established. Regional organs of that board at the government and district level would coordinate their work with local administrative andjudicial authorities, and hire qualified staff from former police departments, procuracies, and criminal investigation boards. It was also proposed that means be devise to increase combat officers' interest in counter-intelligence efforts within the military, primarily at the corps and division level. A special staff of the inspectors-instructors would be instituted to oversee operations. In his conclusion, Khvostov stressed that everything depended on the leadership. Only if somebody at the top "will understand the real threat and will act energetically without any delay would this purpose be achieved rapidly and succesfully. But if it is examined in the usual routine office style, it would be better not to begin at all.1153 But in fact, "the usual routine office style" was the traditional approach of Denikin's administration. For many reasons, his military dictatorship should not be considered a genuine totalitarian regime. Although HighAdministration hadto satisfy both "conservatives" and""liberals," General Denikin failed to satisfy either. The local administrations were not adequately linked to the Center and they often acted contrary to general policy. A lack of any effective system of supervision, disastrous problems with administrative personnel, a yawning gap between the front line and the hinterland-all contributed to widespread corruption and gave free reign to Bolshevik agents everywhere, particularly within thecounter-intelligence service. The few pallitive measures that were taken only further worsened matters. For instance, in 1919, all officals of the Odessa counter-intelligence section were fired on three separate occasions, but soon after almost of them were resored to their former positions! All the officials of the Port of Odessa counter-intelligence group were arrested in October 1919 for bribery.54 Because people like the aforementioned Colonel Kirpicbnikov were common features in the counter-intelligence community, corruption continued unchecked.
On 15 September, 1919, General A. S. Lukomskii, Chairman of the Special Council under General Denikin, presented a comprehensive report about the counter-intelligence service. LikeKhostov, his final conclusions were also harsh: "A multitude of counter-intelligence organs creates an unimaginable mess in the secret serviceand reduces the total activity of all counter-intelligence to zero."55 His report went on to detail many instances of corruption, bribery, senseless brutality, and use of counter-intelligence resources for personal needs. Without suggesting any serious constructive measures, Lukomskii urgently requested that Denikin abolish all illegal and self-instituted counter-intelligence operations, and prohibit any counter-intelligence activity without the permission of the High Command. 56 There were many objective and subjective reasons to explain why almost nothing was done in order to reorganize counter-intelligence. But perhaps the most important was that the High Command's counter-intelligence services, in addition to all their defects, were involved in a widespread anti-Denikin conspiracy coordinated by the Anonymous Center. For example, General Lukomskii's report was prepared not primarily to improve the counter-intelligence service, but rather to limit the intelligence resources of his political opponents inside the High Command and the Special Council.
The Anonymous Center: The Unknown Conspiracy against General Denikin Colonel Bek did not reply to this offer. As a result, he was removed from his position to a symbolic one, a member of the Propaganda Department Council, and put under permanent watch. He decided to present his secret report about the conspiracy to General Romanovskii and Colonel Kovalevskii (head of the Special unit of the Staff). But it was very difficult for Colonel Bek, even with the help of French military mission representatives, to receive a hearing. The conspirators had excellent connections and good reputations. Fortunately, there was clear split in the organization after 13 November 1919, when Grand Duke Nicholas requested that all of them obey General Denikin." L. A. Zubelevich's investigation brought to light considerable evidence about the participation of the Propaganda Department and officials of the Commander-in-Chief Staff in the conspiracy. Nearly all of the known conspirators were either transferred to other positions or dismissed and arrested. Nobody was executed. No details were published in press. The investigation did not extend to the front-line military personnel, probably because it was clear to General Denikin that noisy purges at a time of military defeats would hurt the Army, which had no possibility of replacing purged officers with equally qualified ones. Perhaps General Denikin also trusted that the Grand Duke's request would be followed. Whatever the reason, the Commander-in-Chief did not act decisively on the problem of the right-wing opposition, but only temporarily side-tracked it. Later General Denikin was again confronted by the conspiracy and, after new military defeats and the catastrophic evacuation of Novorossiisk, was ultimately forced to step down.
There is insufficient evidence to ascertain how widespread the conspiracy was in Army Command.f But one thing is very clear-various counter-intelligence and intelligence services of the Commander-in -Chief Staff and the Special Council were involved in conflicts and conspiracy, instead of coordinating their efforts to defeat theirjoint enemy. Thesesquabbles strongly benefited theBolsheviks, separatists and nationalists who opposed the Whites during the Russian Civil War.
State Councillor Odov (head of the counter-intelligence unit of the General-Quartermaster Board of the Armed Forces of South Russia) caredlessabout improving his organization than enhancing its size. He had considerable experience in anti-Bolshevik underground activity. In Petrograd from February to October 1918, he headed the secret intelligence bureau, organized in cooperation with French and British military mission officers and General N. N. Iudenich who lived there illegally. The Orlovbureau consisted of about 80agents who served in various Soviet institutions and obtained valuable secretinformation for the Allies. In addition, over 800 Russian and Polish officers were sent from Petrograd to support the Allied intervention in Northern Russia. After escaping Petrograd during the Red Terror, Orlov continued his activity in Odessa and later became a chief of Denikin' s counter-intelligence. In that capacity, and despite many other pressing concerns including organizational problems, complaints and reorganization projects, Orlov proposed creating a Central International Bureau charged withcollecting information about people connected with the Bolsheviks. The Bureau was to work in connection with its respective foreign counterparts, which he heldshould be formed by the Paris Peace Conference. Orlov enclosed a detailed description of the projected staff which included a head, two deputy heads, 13 foreign representatives, 7 translators, 10 investigation officers, an attorney and guards. He included recommended salaries (in French currency) for each. He also proposed organizing special sections of the Bureau, staffed by experienced Russian officials in the participating countries, the functions of which would be to register all persons coming from Russia and to observe Bolshevik or pro-Bolshevik activity. The special sections should workunder the cover of private firms or trade companies." What happened to Orlov's fantastic project? It was spiked by the Denikin bureacracy, as were many others, including more realistic and reasonable projects.
Conclusions
This study of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services of the White South from late 1917 to early 1920 permits several conclusions.
During the first few months of the Volunteer Army, there was no separation between intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. The most important early goals were to provide reliable connections with the anti-Bolshevik politicians, especially in Moscow and Petrograd, and to attract new volunteers from different parts of the country. Brave individual operations without any strategic coordination characterized this first period.
The formation of the territory of the Volunteer Army after the Second Kuban March and subsequent victories required that military administrative institutions organize counter-intelligence organs directed not against foreign spies, as during the World War I, but against internal opponents. In sum, that they be given the functions of political police. From the summer of 1918 to the summer of 1919, the intelligence service was based on connections provided by the Intelligence Section of the Commander-in-Chief Staff and a network of the Volunteer Army Centers organized outside the Army's territory. General Denikin's military dictatorship was a far cry from a totalitarian regime and did not bring about any real consolidation of the state apparatus. Unbelievable chaos, a huge bureaucracy, widespread corruption, and fierce competition among officials with different subordinations characterized his govermnent and weakened its intelligence and counter-intelligence services. All of these defects were magnified by rivalries with security institutions of the Cossack and newly independent regional governments.
The anti-Bolshevik orientation of the intelligence and counter-intelligence institutions was distracted not only by excessive attention to various rival anti-Bolshevik forces, but also by the participation of security services in the competition for influence over the Commander-in-Chiefand their conspiracies to oust him. The story of the Anonymous Center shows how active such agents were in 29 informing on each other instead of consolidating their anti-Bolshevik activity. This resulted in a considerable rise in the number of Bolshevik agents, provocateurs, corruptedelements anddesperateadventurers among thecounter-intelligence services' ranks.
The only positive features of the intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in the White South before the rule of Vrangel from March 1920 can be attributed to the very professional activities of brave individuals. One significant reason for the poor record of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services is that they did not use the institutional bases constructed and experiences learned by the Imperial Russiangovernment whichhadhad relatively well-organized intelligence and counter-intelligence services. One is struck by the fact that the Whites were not able to take advantage of the conditions inherent in a military dictatorship, with its supposed control over the state apparatus and security services, to effectively gather and beneficially employsensitiveinformation. On the contrary, the numerous defects of the Whitemilitary administration in South Russiahad a strong negative impacton their intelligence and counter-intelligence services.
